The article aims to identify a legal structure to establish state responsibility for historical injustices by using the deportations and mass killings of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire (1915Empire ( -1916 as a case study. It first determines whether the conduct was unlawful at the time it was committed and concludes that the 1948 Genocide Convention cannot be applied retroactively to the events in question and that customary international law provided, at the time, that the treatment by a state of its subjects was within its domestic jurisdiction.
Introduction
It is well-known that a state incurs international responsibility for an internationally wrongful act whenever certain elements are present: the violation of a primary rule, i.e, an obligation arising from any binding source of international law and incumbent 3 The present article has a methodological aim: it intends to identify a legal structure for the determination of state responsibility for alleged past injustices by using the deportations and mass killings of Armenians during the last years of the Ottoman Empire (1915) (1916) as a case study. 9 Two caveats are necessary. First, the article will not address the problem of whether Turkey continues the legal personality of the Ottoman Empire as far as its international rights and obligations are concerned, as this has been dealt with elsewhere. 10 Second, only issues arising from Part One of the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility will be discussed, and not the consequences of the commission of the wrongful act, i.e. the obligation to provide reparation and its implementation.
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The next section will focus on the primary rules, i.e. whether the conduct in question was unlawful at the time it was committed. The analysis will then shift in section 2 to the secondary rules, i.e. whether the conduct was attributable to the state under the law of state responsibility.
The Primary Rules: Was the Conduct Unlawful?
The first step in order to establish if an internationally wrongful act has been committed is to determine whether a primary rule prohibiting the conduct in question was in force at the time of the commissi delicti and was binding on the relevant state.
This is particularly important in the case of historical injustices. Judge Huber, in the Island of Palmas case (1928), famously held that "a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled". 12 principle has been consistently applied, explicitly or implicitly. It is codified in Article 28 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which states that [u] nless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party. 13 It also finds application in the law of state responsibility: according to Article 13 of the ILC's Articles, "[a]n act of state does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the state is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs".
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The Armenian deportations and mass killings have been often qualified as 'genocide': in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention proceedings before the ICJ, for instance, the United States argued that "the Turkish massacres of Armenians"
were one of the "outstanding examples of the crime of genocide". 15 This qualification is strongly contested by Turkey. According to the Turkish government's position, no evidence has been found of the necessary genocidal intent on the part of any Ottoman official: 16 deportations were an emergency measure taken in time of war to prevent a revolt in the Eastern provinces of the Empire and the killings that ensued were the while the legality of the conduct has to be determined according to the substantive law in force when the conduct in question occurred, for procedural rules the critical time is when the court is seized or when it is to deliver its decision ( 20 The Convention would thus cover the events under examination only if it were to be applied retroactively, or if its provisions were considered a codification of pre-existing customary international law.
These arguments will be addressed in turn.
Starting from the former, it has already been noted that both Article 28 VCLT foreseeability of criminality and held that ex post facto laws are objectionable only when after an action indifferent in itself is committed, the legislator then, for the first time, declares it to have been a crime and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed it. Here it is impossible that the party could foresee that an action, innocent when it was done would afterwards be convicted to guilt by subsequent law '.
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Both the Nuremberg and Eichmann cases, however, are criminal trials and do not deal with state responsibility. In practical terms, in criminal prosecutions the problem of how far back in time one can go when applying law retroactively is necessarily a limited problem, as the accused must be alive. By contrast, states usually 'live' longer than human beings (not to mention issues of state succession) and therefore, should we accept retroactivity in at least certain instances, we would face the difficult task of establishing a time limit in the past beyond which not to go in order to avoid, for instance, that Italy is called to account on grounds of genocide for the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC.
In the Eichmann Judgment of 29 May 1962, the Israeli Supreme Court also argued that, at the time the events occurred, the nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege principle had not yet become a rule of customary international law. 29 Similarly, in addition to maintaining that the principle nullum crimen sine lege is a "moral maxim"
that gives way to superior exigencies of justice whenever necessary to punish appalling atrocities, Antonio Cassese has claimed that the legal prohibition of ex post facto laws was still not incorporated in international law at the end of the Second World War, nor was it a general principle of law accepted by all states. 30 But again, the context in which these affirmations were made is international criminal responsibility, not state responsibility. Indeed, if one looks at the early codification attempts in relation to state responsibility, as well as at the above mentioned caselaw, 31 the tempus regit actum rule with regard to state obligations seems uncontroversial already at the beginning of the 20 th century.
Another argument put forward in favour of retroactivity when certain historical injustices were committed is that such past events amount to what are now considered violations of fundamental norms of international law. As the prohibition of genocide, 28 Ibid., pp. Be that as it may, the above opinion, that applies exclusively when the conduct was not unlawful at the time it was committed, cannot be extended to the Armenian case, as Turkey has consistently denied not only its responsibility, but also the occurrence of at least some of the events, their magnitude and their qualification as 'genocide'.
An alternative way to circumvent the retroactivity problem would be to argue that the wrongful act is continuing. 38 This argument has been suggested in relation to reparations for the slave trade: the wrongful act did not end with the abolition of slavery but continues to this day, as slavery severed family relationships, deprived the victims of education and placed them in a situation of social and economic disadvantage with respect to other groups. 39 Transposing this view to our case, it could be claimed that the wrongful act is continuing for as long as Turkey does not acknowledge its responsibility and provide reparations, in particular the return of Armenian properties. This argument, however, cannot be accepted. IX of the 1856 Treaty of Paris expressed the will of the Sultan to ameliorate the conditions of his subjects "without distinction of Religion or of race" and refers to a Firman (Imperial decree) "which records his generous intentions towards the Christian population of his Empire": 59 however, the provision specified explicitly that this did not give the European Powers the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The 1877 London Protocol concluded between Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia declared that the six signatories would "watch carefully" the manner in which the Ottoman Empire complied with its promises with regard to the nationalities and minorities in the Empire. It also provided for consultation and joint action should the Powers be "once more disappointed". 60 The Protocol qualified the introduction of reforms and the amelioration of the conditions of the Christian subjects of the Sultan as "indispensable to the tranquillity of Europe" and warned that failure to do so would be incompatible with the interests of the Great Powers and of Europe in general: to use modern language, the situation of Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire amounted to a "threat to the peace". 61 The Protocol was however rejected by Turkey and the Turkish-Russian War of 1877-1878 ensued, which led to the occupation by Russia of portions of Turkish Armenia. Under Article XVI of the subsequent 1878 Preliminary
Peace Treaty of San Stefano between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the first international agreement to specifically refer to the Armenians, the Sublime Porte engages to carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians. 62 The provision, then, provided for two international obligations owed by Turkey towards Russia: to introduce the necessary reforms and to protect the Armenians.
Thereafter, in reaction to the growing influence of Russia, the United Kingdom secretly concluded the 1878 Cyprus Convention with the Ottoman Empire. Under its Article I, the former undertook to defend the latter against Russia in Asia. In return, the Ottoman Empire committed to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the government, and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories.
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The Eastern Question, i.e. the problems originating from the political and economic weakness of the Ottoman Empire, was eventually settled at the 1878
Congress of Berlin. Article LXII of the Treaty of Berlin, which superseded the Treaty of San Stefano, provided that
[i]n no part of the Ottoman Empire shall difference of religion be alleged against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity as regards the discharge of civil and political rights, admission to the public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of the various professions and industries … The right of official protection by … the Powers in Turkey is recognized ... 64 More significantly, Article LXI contains an obligation on the Ottoman Empire to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend their application. 65 A commentator of the time affirmed that the Armenians were thus placed 67 At the latest by 1878, then, the Armenian question was not just an internal affair, but a matter of international obligation: the conclusion of the above mentioned treaties had removed it from the domestic jurisdiction of the Porte. 68 The actions of the Ottoman authorities towards the Armenian minority, therefore, constituted an internationally wrongful act in the form of breaches of treaty obligations. 69 It is true that the treaties under examination only provided for an obligation on the Ottoman Empire to protect the Armenians, and not for an obligation not to commit certain harmful actions against them, but, as the ICJ clarified in the Bosnian Genocide case in relation to genocide,
[i]t would be paradoxical if States were … under an obligation to prevent, so far as within their power, the commission of genocide by persons over whom they have a certain influence, but were not forbidden to commit such acts through their own organs, or persons over whom they have such firm control that their conduct is attributable to the State concerned under international law.
70 67 Ibid., p. 35. Rolin-Jaequemyns noted that the Great Powers acquired not only a right, but also a duty to ensure the correct implementation of the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin (ibid., p. 40). In several diplomatic notes, the United Kingdom protested against the non-introduction of reforms and invoked the implementation of Art. LXI of the Treaty of Berlin and of the Cyprus Convention (ibid., pp. 51-53). The Great Powers also issued an Identical Note (11 June 1880) and a Collective Note (7 September 1880, sent on 11 September), which demanded the execution of Art. LXI of the Treaty of Berlin (ibid., pp. 83-84, 88-93). 68 The above mentioned Identical Note of 11 June 1880 refers to the "grave responsibility the Porte would incur by any fresh delay in the execution of the measures which the Powers agree in considering to be essential to the interests of the Ottoman Empire and of Europe" (text in Rolin-Jaequemyns, supra note 66, p. 84). 69 There can be little doubt that, by this time, international responsibility arose as a result of a breach of treaty obligations: see for instance Arts. 166. Even though, under Art. I of the Convention, the states parties to the Genocide Convention only expressly undertake "to prevent and to punish" genocide in time of peace or war, the ICJ held that the Genocide Convention also contains an obligation on states not to commit genocide on the basis of Art. I, for two reasons: because the provision qualifies genocide as a "crime under international law", which means that states parties must "logically" have undertaken the obligation not to commit the act themselves, and because "the obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies the prohibition of the commission of genocide" (ibid.). According to the ICJ, states are also bound not to commit the Whether the international responsibility of the Ottoman Empire arose solely for the deportations and for not preventing the killings, or also for the killings themselves, depends on whether the murderous conduct carried out by individuals was attributable to the Empire. This will be investigated in the next section.
The Secondary Rules: Can the Conduct of the Relevant Individuals Be
Attributed to the Ottoman Empire?
As already noted, for state responsibility to arise it is necessary not only that there is a breach of a primary rule, but also that the violation is imputable to a state according to the secondary rules on attribution. These rules are presently codified in Chapter II of Part One of the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility.
Assuming -as argued in the previous section -that the acts under examination were unlawful at the time they were committed, were they attributable to the Ottoman ancillary offences codified in Art. III (conspiracy, direct and public incitement, attempt to commit genocide and complicity) because of the "purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose" of the Convention, which would only be promoted if states are subject to the full spectrum of the Convention's obligations (ibid., para. 167). In the previous Preliminary Objections judgment, the Court had already ruled that "the reference in Article IX [of the Genocide Convention] to 'the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III' does not exclude any form of State responsibility" and that " [n] or is the responsibility of a State for acts of its organs excluded by Article IV of the Convention, which contemplates the commission of an act of genocide by 'rulers' or 'public officials'" (Genocide (Preliminary Objections), supra note 25, para. 32). These conclusions have been criticised by some commentators, according to which the Convention is "merely a treaty establishing judicial co-operation among contracting states to ensure the prevention and punishment of such a heinous crime through the adoption of appropriate national legislation, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction and the extradition of persons allegedly responsible for genocide" (Paola Gaeta 73 The three men effectively ruled the Ottoman Empire until its defeat in the First World War. 74 The organization and execution of the deportations were entrusted to local authorities and to the military with the latter accompanying the convoys, while the killings that ensued were perpetrated by several groups and agencies, including irregular units of the Ottoman army. 75 In particular, newly formed brigand units of the Special Organization (Teshkilati Mahsusa), a semi-official entity set up by the CUP which also included former convicts, were employed to attack the Armenian convoys during the deportations to Syria and northern Iraq. 76 It also seems that large mobs were mobilised. 77 Five categories of individuals appear then to have been involved in the events under examination: the decision-makers, the Ottoman army, the local authorities, the Special Organization and other irregular units, and the mobs.
Even though the early codification efforts focused exclusively on state responsibility for damages caused to foreigners and their property, the general bases of attribution as we know them today were already well-established when the Armenian deportations and killings took place. 78 Article I of the Resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law in 1927 declared a state responsible for the acts of its organs whether or not in conformity with law or superior orders. 79 
Ultra vires
acts of organs committed within their apparent authority or general scope of authority were also deemed to entail state responsibility at the time of the events under consideration. 80 Bey and others trial, held that the Organization "had been formed for the purpose of destroying and annihilating the Armenians". 91 If the actions of the Special Organization's units went beyond the scope of the specific instructions received, one should determine "whether the unlawful or unauthorized conduct was really incidental to the mission or clearly went beyond it"; 92 in particular, "where persons or groups have committed acts under the effective control of a State, the condition for attribution will still be met even if particular instructions may have been ignored". 93 As to the mobs that attacked the convoys and the deportees, their conduct cannot be attributed to the Ottoman Empire, even though they might have been incited to attack by state authorities. There is no express regulation of incitement in the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility. 94 Incitement would thus entail state responsibility for the incited actions only to the extent it amounts to instructions, direction and control. 95 After inciting the actions, however, state authorities might subsequently publicly endorse them and adopt them as their own: 96 in the Hostages case, the ICJ held that, although the initial attack on the US Embassy in Teheran was not attributable to Iran, the subsequent endorsement by the Iranian authorities and the decision to perpetuate the occupation transformed the occupation and detention of the hostages into acts of the state. 97 It does not seem that such public endorsement occurred with regard to the events in question. Of course, the state would still be responsible for not preventing the attacks by the mobs. However, the responsibility would arise here not from the fact that the conduct of private individuals was attributable, but from the state's failure to comply with its due diligence primary obligation to prevent the occurrence of certain events.
Conclusions
Any claim for reparation for historical injustices will necessarily have to demonstrate: or under the direction or control, of the Ottoman authorities. On the other hand, the mob attacks cannot be attributed to the Empire, which is however responsible under the above mentioned treaties for not preventing them.
